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BREXIT AND THE IRISH BORDER 
Eileen Connolly and John Doyle
The question of the Irish land border was the most problematic aspect of the 
negotiations on the United Kingdom's (UK) withdrawal from the European Union 
(EU). The Irish border aspects of the Brexit negotiations have demonstrated that the 
border and the maintenance of the Good Friday Agreement is not just an issue for 
British-Irish relations, but one that now has a strong EU dimension. This article 
analyses the political impact of alternative proposals tabled during the Brexit 
negotiations on Northern Ireland and the question of the Irish Border. It places this 
discussion in the post-conflict context and in the highly politicised nature of the Brexit 
referendum debate in Northern Ireland. It examines how the issue was framed, 
following a tortuous negotiation process, in the draft Withdrawal Agreement of 2018 
and the ultimate failure of the UK government to ratify that agreement in Parliament. 
It evaluates the political impacts of the crisis in British politics caused by Brexit and 
the way in which Brexit has undermined the political stability created by the Good 
Friday Agreement and at the same time changed the discourse on Irish unity. It argues 
that failure of the British Government to accurately assess the EU27 position is at the 
heart of their failure to negotiate a Withdrawal Agreement, for which they could 
build UK parliamentary support. It is this failure of political judgement that has led 
to the rejection of the negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and continued to block 
agreement on a way forward, in the period prior to the October 2019 deadline. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of the Irish land border was the most problematic aspect of the 
negotiations on the United Kingdom's (UK) withdrawal from the European 
Union (EU). This issue had not been part of the 2016 referendum campaign 
debate outside of Ireland, but from the beginning of the negotiation process, 
in 2017, it became an increasingly prominent aspect of the mainstream Brexit 
debate.1 It was the inclusion of a 'backstop' provision to address the problem 
of a hard border on the island of Ireland in the draft Withdrawal Agreement 
that ultimately led to the defeat of the draft Withdrawal Agreement in the 
UK Parliament. For the Irish government, and the nationalist parties in 
Northern Ireland, the threat of Brexit for the maintenance of peace in 
Northern Ireland, the quality of life in the border communities, and for 
economic development, was clear from the time of the 2016 referendum 
campaign. Following the referendum vote, the Irish Government proactively 
conducted a strong diplomatic campaign in the EU institutions and amongst 
the other Member States, seeking support for its position that there could be 
no negotiated hard border on the island of Ireland. The Irish government's 
case was that Brexit challenged the basis of the peace process by raising the 
possibility that the frontier could again become a customs, regulatory and 
security border, a site of armed attacks, and an indication that the Good 
Friday Agreement had been reversed. The British government's negotiating 
strategy appeared to some of those closely involved to rest on the key 
assumptions that they did not accept that there was a threat to the peace 
process and that the EU as a whole would prioritise achieving a trade 
 
1 See John Doyle and Eileen Connolly, 'Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question' 
in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law and Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 
2017). 
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agreement with the UK over any EU commitment to the Irish Government.2 
The Irish border aspects of the Brexit negotiations have demonstrated that 
the border and the maintenance of the Good Friday Agreement is not just an 
issue for British-Irish relations, but one that now has a strong EU dimension. 
The failure of the British Government to accurately assess the EU27 position 
is at the heart of their failure to negotiate a Withdrawal Agreement, for 
which they could build UK parliamentary support, with the resultant 
political chaos in parliament and widening divisions in UK society.   
The border on the island of Ireland will be the only significant post-Brexit 
land border between the EU and the UK, and at the core of the disagreement 
on the form the border should take are the contested views on the desired 
relationship between Northern Ireland, Ireland and the British state.3 The 
1998 Good Friday Agreement, an international treaty lodged with the United 
Nations that ended 30 years of armed conflict, had redefined this set of 
relationships and shifted both the reality, and the perception, of British 
sovereignty in Northern Ireland. The Irish government proposed that 
customs and security infrastructure on the Irish land border could be avoided 
by leaving the border open while having the necessary regulatory and customs 
checks for the UK/EU border at the airports and seaports – in effect a de-
facto 'border' in the Irish Sea. This makes economic sense for a small island 
economy, and it would be particularly beneficial for Northern Ireland's 
underdeveloped post-conflict private sector. While exports from Ireland to 
the UK as a whole have been declining as a proportion of all Irish exports for 
many years and now represent less than 10 per cent of total exports, cross-
border trade between the two parts of the island increased substantially after 
the 1994 ceasefires, from €1.6 billion to €3.7 billion per annum. While the 
growth was evenly shared in both directions, it was more significant for the 
 
2 Perspectives of Irish and EU officials involved in the process, as articulated in 
discussion with the authors during 2017, 2018 and 2019 – multiple discussions and 
different officials. 
3 There is one other land border, Gibraltar, which has however, because of the very 
different context, not become a major issue. See Maria Mut Bosque, 'Ten Different 
Formulas for Gibraltar Post-Brexit' (2018). DCU Brexit Institute - Working paper 
N. 6 - 2018 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3212246> accessed 14 October 2019. 
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much smaller Northern Ireland economy.4 The British government's refusal 
to support this solution has its roots in the long-term relationship between 
Britain and Ireland and the political divisions in Northern Ireland that were 
the basis of the 20th century conflict. In its negotiations to find a way of 
keeping the Irish border open while strengthening the place of Northern 
Ireland in the UK, the UK government did not give sufficient weight to the 
EU's absolute requirement to ensure that the UK's future single market 
access does not provide more favourable terms than those available to 
Member States and that, in this regard, the enforcement of regulatory issues 
was as important as the control of customs. The UK government also 
miscalculated the primary motivation of the EU's support for the Good 
Friday peace agreement, in that it would support a Member State against a 
departing state, but also that the EU has a strongly internalised view of its 
own history as a peace project.5  The EU has its own interests in supporting 
the peace process in general and the open border as a central part of the peace 
agreement. The EU was never likely to agree to a Withdrawal Agreement, or 
a future trade deal, that impacted on the core interests of a Member State, 
and which was perceived to pursue a narrow trade interest at the expense of 
peace. 
This article analyses the political impact of alternative proposals tabled 
during the Brexit negotiations on Northern Ireland and the question of the 
Irish Border. Section 2 discusses the post-conflict context and the highly 
politicised nature of the Brexit referendum debate in Northern Ireland. 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 then proceed to analyse how the border was dealt with in 
the various phases of negotiations between the EU and the UK, how the issue 
was framed in the draft withdrawal agreement of 2018 and the ultimate failure 
to ratify that agreement in the UK Parliament. Finally, section 6 explores the 
political impacts of the crisis in British politics caused by Brexit and how 
Brexit has undermined the political stability created by the Good Friday 
Agreement and changed the discourse on Irish unity.  
 
4 See 'Inter-Trade Ireland statistics' <https://intertradeireland.com/insights/trade-
statistics/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
5 See, for example, Gëzim Visoka and John Doyle, 'Neo-Functional Peace: The 
European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts' (2016) 54(4) Journal of Common 
Market Studies 862. 
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II. THE THREAT OF BREXIT FOR THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS 
After the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, British army 
security installations were gradually removed and closed cross-border roads 
were re-opened so that within a few years no hard border existed on the island 
of Ireland. This is one of the most visible and also the most symbolic 
outcomes of the peace process. It is the potential loss of the open border that 
is the seen as the greatest threat resulting from Brexit by the majority of the 
population of Ireland. Although Ireland and the UK have operated a 
common travel area since Irish independence in 1922, given the tensions that 
followed the partition of the Ireland and different customs rules (until 1992), 
the border, while porous in many respects, did act as a tangible barrier to 
cross-border social and economic cooperation. This was heightened by the 
sporadic conflict that existed through the mid-twentieth century and in 
particular the intensified levels of conflict from the end of the 1960s. That 
meant that the border was closely monitored, with over 200 cross-border 
roads barricaded by the British Army and large-scale military posts on the 
main 'official' crossing points. The disruption of the road closures and border 
checks, with frequent delays at crossing points, and the negative experience 
of the heavy British Army security presence, severely curtailed cross-border 
traffic and trade. Even following the implementation of the EU single market 
from 1992, which removed customs posts, the security installations on the 
border were a significant barrier to cross-border trade.6  
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement changed this situation and allowed an 
open border, as envisaged by the EU's ongoing integration project, as well as 
reflecting the Irish nationalist community's strong political desire for greater 
all-island cooperation. Re-imposing a border, as a result of Brexit, will have a 
negative impact on Northern Ireland's already weak economy. As a post-
conflict economy, the public sector still provides approximately 60 per cent 
of Gross Value Added,7 while direct EU funding, including subsidies from the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the designated Peace Funds, was equivalent 
 
6 Donnacha Ó Beacháin, From Partition to Brexit: The Irish Government and Northern 
Ireland (Manchester University Press 2018).   
7 Nevin Economic Research Institute, 'Quarterly Economic Observer' (2017) 9-11  
<http://www.nerinstitute.net/download/pdf/qeo_spring_2017_final_version.pdf>  
accessed 15 October 2019.  
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to approximately 8.4 per cent of Northern Ireland's GDP in the period 2007-
13.8 Northern Ireland is more reliant on the EU as an export market than the 
rest of the UK and will be more affected by a withdrawal from the EU and 
from the single market. The Republic of Ireland is Northern Ireland's largest 
single destination for exports, accounting for 21 per cent of all exports and 37 
per cent of EU exports.9 The combination of the disruption to the slowly 
emerging post-conflict, all-island economic integration and the loss of EU 
subsidies will have a significant impact on the economy of Northern Ireland 
that may have serious consequences for political stability. There were 
significant levels of politically related violence in Northern Ireland in the 
summer of 2019 in both working class Irish nationalist and unionist areas.10 
An economy in recession is likely to see unemployment rise in these 
communities. The impact of a recession in working class communities is 
likely to be amplified in the specific circumstances of Northern Ireland, as in 
the absence of an agreement to restore the power-sharing executive, 
Northern Ireland's specific deal postponing the implementation of British 
Governments cuts to social services spending in the rest of the UK, will 
expire in March 2020, leading to substantial cuts in welfare spending.11   
 
8 Leslie Budd,'The Consequences for the Northern Ireland Economy from a United 
Kingdom exit from the European Union' (2015) Briefing Note: Committee for 
Enterprise, Trade and Investment <http://crossborder.ie/site2015/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/2015-03-22-brexit-ceti-specialist-advisor.pdf> accessed 15 
October 2019. 
9 UK Parliament Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 'Northern Ireland and the 
EU Referendum' (2016) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/ 
cmselect/cmniaf/48/4804.htm#footnote-104> accessed 15 October 2019.  
10 See for example Mahita Gajanan 'A Journalist's Killing in Northern Ireland Comes 
as Tensions Threaten to Boil Over' Time (24 April 2019) 
<https://time.com/5574194/northern-ireland-violence-lyra-mckee/> accessed 15 
October 2019 and Patrick Cockburn, 'The English are Blindly Driving Northern 
Ireland to Conflict – The Fear Is That They Are Too Stupid to Care' Independent 
(UK) (1 March 2019) <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/northern-ireland-
backstop-the-troubles-theresa-may-brexit-european-union-red-lines-
a8803336.html> accessed 15 October 2019.  
11 Northern Ireland Audit Office, 'Report on Welfare Reform' (2019) 
<https://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/publications/welfare-reforms-northern-
ireland-0> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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In political terms, the Good Friday Agreement defined a bi-national polity, 
with a system of consociational power-sharing in its internal governance 
structures. The bi-national nature of the settlement was also demonstrated 
in the special position accorded to the Irish government in the affairs of 
Northern Ireland and in the legal commitment from the UK government to 
legislate for Irish unity should concurrent majorities vote for unity in Ireland, 
North and South.12 The success of the Good Friday Agreement was premised 
on the fact that it did not establish an end point but began a process, which 
had no predetermined outcome. This meant that the Irish government, and 
the Irish nationalist community, were not asked to abandon their political 
objective of Irish unity, but they agreed to pursue it by exclusively peaceful 
means. The unionist population were not asked to abandon their desire to 
remain part of the UK, but they were required to acknowledge that if a 
majority of the population of Northern Ireland voted for Irish unity, they 
would acquiesce to this while also retaining their British citizenship. This 
fluidity is essential to the on-going success of the peace process, as it has 
allowed both unionists and nationalists to work within its framework.13 It has 
also resulted in the border areas becoming more integrated, both socially and 
economically. Local communities now fear the imposition of a hard land 
border, both for the disruption that this will entail in their personal lives and 
also because they fear that the inevitable border infrastructure will become a 
focus of attacks by dissident republican groups that have opposed the peace 
process, and that this will result in a spiral of renewed violence.14  
Brexit also has the potential to disrupt the high level of cross border 
collaboration that has developed in a number of areas of public provision, 
such as emergency ambulance services, as well as in economic development. 
 
12 Good Friday Agreement (1998). Annex: Agreement between the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government 
of Ireland, Annex A, Schedule 1. 
13 Jennifer Todd, 'Nationalism, Republicanism and the Good Friday Agreement' in 
Jennifer Todd and Joe Ruane (eds), After the Good Friday Agreement (University 
College Dublin Press 1999). 
14 Peter Mandelson 'EU exit risks peace process and return to violence' Belfast 
Newsletter, (15 March 2016),  'Brexit: Protests held along Irish border' (BBC, 30 
March 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-47761230> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
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For Irish nationalists it will raise fears that the gradual process of reform and 
integration at the heart of the 1998 Agreement has ended. For hard-line 
unionists, in contrast, the reversal of North-South cooperation and 
integration would be a welcome aspect of Brexit. From their perspective, a 
hard border will weaken the link to Ireland and to the EU and strengthen 
links to the UK. They are willing to risk disruption along the border, and the 
possibility of a return to violence, as the price for the reassertion of the 
Britishness of Northern Ireland. The EU negotiation team argued in a 
published report that reversing North-South cooperation in Ireland would 
risk a return to violence, indicating that the public position of the EU team 
reflected the analysis of the Irish Government on this point.15   
III. THE REFERENDUM AND ITS EFFECTS ON NI POLITICS 
In the debate on Brexit, the threat to the Good Friday Agreement was 
recognised in both parts of the island of Ireland from the beginning and it 
played a key part in the campaign in Northern Ireland, in contrast to the rest 
of the UK, where the impact of Brexit on the peace process was very rarely 
discussed by the main political actors in the referendum campaign.16 In 
Northern Ireland, the campaign was dominated by the specific impacts of 
Brexit on the peace process and on the economy, rather than immigration 
and the regulatory aspects of the EU that dominated the debate in Britain.  
The two major Irish nationalist parties, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP), called for a vote to remain in the EU, as did the 
smaller pro-union party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the centrist 
(but traditionally pro-union) Alliance Party. The largest unionist party, the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the small and more conservative 
Traditional Unionist Voice campaigned to leave. Sinn Féin and the SDLP 
 
15 See for example, European Commission, 'Mapping of North-South Cooperation 
and Implementation Bodies: Report and Key Findings of the Exercise' (2019)  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/mapping-north-south-
cooperation-implementation-bodies-report-and-key-findings-exercise_en> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
16 Gerard McCann and Paul Hainsworth, 'Brexit and Northern Ireland: the 2016 
referendum on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union' (2017) 
32(2) Irish Political Studies 327. 
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focused on the negative economic impact of leaving and the undermining of 
the peace process.17 As the largest unionist party and the largest party actively 
campaigning for Brexit, the DUP reflected its long-standing opposition to 
European integration and from this position its campaign strategy was to 
deny the potential threats to the economy or to the peace process.18 As early 
as 2016 the possibility of a de-facto 'border' between the EU and the UK 
situated in the Irish Sea was discussed as a response to the need for regulatory 
and customs checks. Those in favour of this solution argued that, 
notwithstanding the political sensitivities, introducing additional checks on 
goods in two airports and two ports was achievable, and less politically 
disruptive, than seeking to carry out such checks along the 499km land 
border. The prominence of this question from the beginning of the Brexit 
debate in Northern Ireland meant that the question of the location of the 
future border-checks between the UK and the EU single market was a key 
issue for unionists during the referendum. The UUP, whose official position 
was to support remaining in the EU, argued that the experience during the 
conflict meant that 'it is not possible to fully secure the border' and that 
Brexit could result in a border that was at 'Great Britain's ports and airports 
– Cairnryan, Gatwick, Heathrow', which in their view had the potential to 
weaken the Union.19 Pro-Remain unionists feared that this 'existential threat 
to the United Kingdom' would be strengthened if Scotland looked for a 
second referendum on independence as a way of staying in the EU in the 
context of Brexit.20 Sinn Féin also identified Irish unity as the route through 
 
17 Statement from Party President Gerry Adams TD (Sinn Féin, 9 June 2016)  
<http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/40268> accessed 15 October 2019; 'Sinn Féin 
Launches Campaign against UK Brexit’ (RTE, 3 June 2016) 
<https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/0603/793106-brexit-campaign/> accessed 15 
October 2019. 
18 See, for example, party adverts and statements by party leader Arlene Foster, Belfast 
Telegraph (17 June 2016). 
19 'UUP Manifesto for 2016 NI Assembly Election' (Ulster Unionist Party 2016).  See 
also post Brexit call from SDLP leader Colum Eastwood for any border controls 
imposed post-Brexit to be imposed between the islands of Ireland and Great 
Britain, 'Eastwood: Impose Border with Britain, Not on Island', Londonderry 
Sentinel (24 June 2016) <http://www.londonderrysentinel.co.uk/news/eastwood-
impose-border-with-britain-not-on-island-1-7448357> accessed 15 October 2019. 
20 See <http://uup.org/news/4128#.WNuq_BIrK-o> accessed 15 October 2019.  
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which Northern Ireland could remain in the EU, arguing that in the event of 
a UK referendum result for leaving the EU, with a Northern Ireland majority 
for remaining, 'there would then be a democratic imperative for a border poll 
to provide Irish citizens with the right to vote for an end to partition and to 
retain a role in the EU'.21 Some civil society groups and individuals from the 
unionist community in Northern Ireland campaigned for the UK to remain 
in the EU. In 2016, the level of campaigning was low, as these groups did not 
think Brexit was likely; however, they became much more vocal and visible as 
the chances of a 'no-deal' Brexit increased. 22  
In the 2016 referendum vote, the 'remain' vote in Northern Ireland was 56 
per cent, with a major divide between the two main political traditions, 
reflecting their views on the 'national question'. This division was 
demonstrated by a survey of 4,000 adults in Northern Ireland by the 
Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study23. This survey found that 88 per 
cent of self-defined Irish nationalists voted to remain in the EU, while 66 per 
cent of self-defined unionists voted to leave; 70 per cent of those who chose 
to identify as 'neither' voted to stay in the EU.24 This voting behaviour largely 
reflects the positions of the Northern Ireland political parties25, but the 
results also show that a significant bloc of unionist voters did not follow their 
parties' lead, while a much smaller proportion of nationalist voters deviated 
from the parties' positions and voted to leave. Although the UUP had called 
for a vote to remain, 58 per cent of their voters voted for Brexit and the party 
changed to being pro-Brexit after the poll. 25 per cent of DUP supporters also 
voted to remain, despite their party being the leading voice in the local Brexit 
campaign. 
 
21 Gerry Adams, Irish Independent, (18 June 2016). 
22 Gerard McCann & Paul Hainsworth. Brexit and Northern Ireland: the 2016 
referendum on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union, (2017) 
32:2 Irish Political Studies, p. 333. 
23 John Garry, 'The EU referendum Vote in Northern Ireland: Implications for our 
understanding of citizens' political views and behaviour', (2016) Northern Ireland 
Assembly Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series.  
24 John Garry, 'The EU referendum …' 
25 All of the significant political parties in Northern Ireland are local and none of the 
mainstream UK parties have any significant electoral support in Northern Ireland. 
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The changing dynamics of underlying political party support was also 
demonstrated in the Northern Ireland elections of March 2017, precipitated 
by the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive in January following the 
resignation of the Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness of Sinn Féin. 
This resignation was a response to the DUP's refusal to negotiate on a range 
of equality-related matters including Irish language rights, marriage equality 
for gay couples, and the question of how to deal with legacy issues from the 
conflict. The DUP used a technical provision called a Petition of Concern, 
designed to prevent the abuse of majority rule, to veto legislative changes that 
had the support of a majority of the NI Assembly, even though the issues 
could not reasonably be argued to represent a fundamental threat to the 
unionist community as a whole. The on-going tensions in the Assembly 
moved to a total collapse of the Executive following new allegations of 
widespread corruption in the handling of a subsidy scheme for renewable 
energy, which had been run by the department led by Arleen Foster before 
she became First Minister and leader of the DUP.  
The elections that followed in March 2017 produced for the first time since 
partition a representative assembly in Northern Ireland that did not contain 
a majority of members who could be described as unequivocally unionists, 
that is, committed in every circumstance to Northern Ireland remaining in 
the UK. Only 45 per cent of the population voted for traditional unionist 
parties, while 40 per cent voted for parties committed to Irish unity, with just 
under 15 per cent voting for smaller parties and independents who did not 
prioritise the national question but many of which had been supportive of EU 
membership during the referendum.26 The fact that for the first time less 
than 50 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland voted for parties for 
whom opposition to Irish unity is a core policy demonstrates the way in 
which on-going demographic change has intersected with the debates on EU 
membership and open-borders, shifting the dynamics of public sentiment on 
the national question.27 The elections did not, however, lead to a new 
 
26 See full results Northern Ireland Assembly, 'Election Report: Northern Ireland 
Assembly Election, 2 March 2017' Research and Information Service Research 
Paper <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/ 
2017-2022/2017/general/2217.pdf> accessed 15 October 2019.  
27 Northern Ireland Executive, 'Statistical - Labour Force Survey Religion Report 
2015' (2017). 
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Executive being formed as the same issues that led to its collapse remained 
unresolved, and the capacity of the parties in Northern Ireland or the 
sovereign governments to negotiate an agreed way forward was further 
weakened by the deep divisions on Brexit. 
IV. NEGOTIATING THE IRISH BORDER 
There had only been a very limited discussion on the Irish border issue in the 
mainstream debate within Britain during the referendum campaigns, with 
both sides ignoring the issue.28 However, the question of the land border 
between Ireland and the UK quickly became central to the post-referendum 
Brexit debate and to the negotiations with the EU, and it was the major 
stumbling block in the British government's attempts to get the negotiated 
Withdrawal Agreement passed through the British parliament. 
The initial post-referendum public stance of the UK government was to 
minimise the significance of the question of the Irish border. Although the 
relationship between the UK and Ireland was one of the 12 key points of a 
major speech by Prime Minister Theresa May in January 2017, it only 
contained a commitment to 'the maintenance of the Common Travel Area 
with the Republic, while protecting the integrity of the United Kingdom's 
immigration system'.29 The UK government's opening position in 
negotiations had made it clear that they wished to leave both the EU single 
market and the customs union, and were also not willing to allow free 
movement of workers between the EU and the UK following their 
withdrawal. That these objectives 'require a hard border between north and 
south in Ireland' was confirmed by Peter Sutherland, a former Secretary 
 
28 Matt O'Toole, 'Ireland an Afterthought During Brexit Campaign When I Was 
Cameron Adviser' The Irish Times (4 October 2017) <https:// 
www.irishtimes.com/opinion/ireland-an-afterthought-during-brexit-campaign-
when-i-was-cameron-adviser-1.3242732> accessed 15 October 2019. 
29 Speech by Theresa May, Lancaster House (17 January 2017) <https:// 
www.independent.ie/business/brexit/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-in-full-
35374214.html> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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General of the WTO,30 and by Michel Barnier, the EU's chief negotiator.31 
Prime Minster May's Article 50 TEU letter of March 2017, which triggered 
the two-year negotiation period, stated that the UK wanted to 'avoid a return 
to a hard border' on the island of Ireland and 'to make sure that nothing is 
done to jeopardise the peace process in Northern Ireland'. While reiterating 
her determination to leave the customs union, May also stated that a hard 
border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK was 
'unacceptable',32 proposing a range of technical solutions, none of which had 
been successfully deployed in other contexts.33  
The Irish Government had from September 2016 lobbied intensely on the 
negative impact that a post-Brexit hard border would have on Ireland and on 
the Northern Ireland 'peace process'.34 The success of this lobbying was 
demonstrated on 29 April 2017, when the European Council agreed that the 
EU's Article 50 negotiation guidelines would include the Irish border 
question as one of three key issues to be addressed in the initial phase of 
 
30 Harry McGee, 'Sutherland Rejects Claim Brexit Would Not Bring Hard Border' 
The Irish Times (2 September 2016) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ 
politics/sutherland-rejects-claim-brexit-would-not-bring-hard-border-1.2776397> 
accessed 15 October 2019.. 
31 Michel Barnier, EU Chief Negotiator with the United Kingdom, in a speech to the 
Irish Oireachtas (parliament) on 11 May 2017 said 'Customs controls are part of EU 
border management. They protect the single market. They protect our food safety 
and our standards'. See <https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/michel-barnier-
address-to-the-oireachtas.pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
32 Theresa May's speech on future UK-EU relations (2 March 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-43256183> accessed 15 October 2019. 
33 'Irish Border Technology "Not Answer to Trade"' (BBC, 11 April 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-47895982> accessed 15 October 
2019. 
34 See formal Government of Ireland press release on Brexit strategy, 2 May 2017 – 
referencing as priorities the land-border, the common travel area with the UK 
,and the peace process (para 2) <http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Govern 
ment_Press_Releases/Government_Statement_on_Brexit_Preparations.html> 
accessed 15 October 2019; see also European Council statement on Article 50 
negotiation guidelines of 29 April 2017, which also include references to these 
three issues.   <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/ 
04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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negotiations.35 The guidelines defined the phased nature of the EU's 
approach, with a requirement to finalise the Withdrawal Agreement before 
any discussion on the future EU-UK relationship. This meant that there had 
to be substantial progress on the arrangement to avoid a hard border on the 
island of Ireland before the negotiations could move to the framework of 
future EU-UK relations.36 The EU also expressed concerns about the impact 
of Brexit on Northern Ireland: its negotiation directives published on 22 May 
2017 explicitly stated that nothing in the final agreement with the UK should 
'undermine the objectives and commitments set out in the Good Friday 
Agreement' and that negotiations should 'in particular aim to avoid the 
creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland', while respecting the 
Union's legal order.37 The position of the Irish government was also 
strengthened by the formal decision of the European Council that in the 
event of a future vote in favour of Irish unity, Northern Ireland would be 
deemed to be automatically within the EU, without the need for a Treaty 
agreement or a vote of other members.38 This decision relied heavily on the 
German precedent, whereby former East Germany became part of the EU as 
a result of its unification with West Germany. For the Irish government, this 
was a long-term safety net and not a short-term priority. The UK government 
was surprised at these decisions and was even more surprised that both the 
 
35 Council of The European Union, 'Directives for the Negotiation of an Agreement 
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Setting out the 
Arrangements for its Withdrawal from the European Union' (22 May 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/negotiating-directives-article-50-
negotiations_en> accessed 15 October 2019. 
36 Etain Tannam, 'Brexit and the British-Irish Relationship' (2018) DCU Brexit 
Institute Working Paper <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2018/01/brexit-and-
british-irish-relationship/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
37  Council of The European Union (n 35) para 14. 
38 European Parliament, 'Outcome of the special European Council (Article 50) 
meeting of 29 April 2017' <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ 
ATAG/2017/603226/EPRS_ATA(2017)603226_EN.pdf> accessed 15 October 
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EU negotiation team and the wider EU27 remained united on this issue even 
when the talks became difficult.39 
In April 2017, Theresa May announced that there would be an early general 
election in June of that year, which she called in a bid to secure a larger 
parliamentary majority for her Brexit negotiation strategy. This decision 
backfired; she lost her majority in parliament and in order to form a 
government had to enter a 'confidence and supply' agreement with Northern 
Ireland's DUP. This gave the DUP a privileged position in Downing Street 
and a disproportionate influence on the Brexit negotiations. In practice this 
meant that any solution that would avoid a hard border on the island of 
Ireland, which would inevitably entail a 'special status' for Northern Ireland, 
could be vetoed by the DUP, along with hard-line elements of the 
Conservative Party.   
The UK Government issued a position paper on Northern Ireland in August 
2017.40 It reiterated its desire to avoid a hard land border on the island of 
Ireland but also strongly ruled out any 'customs border' between Northern 
Ireland and Britain. The UK proposed a number of approaches which they 
believed could resolve the apparent contradictions in their positions.41 These 
included the idea of a 'customs partnership', which would have involved the 
UK acting on the EU's behalf, applying the EU's own tariffs and rules of 
origin to all goods arriving in the UK intended for the EU, and suggested that 
new technology could be used to track whether items eventually ended up in 
the UK or crossed into the EU; tariffs would be charged accordingly. There 
was no commitment in this proposal to ensure that single market regulations 
were protected on issues such as food safety and, though unstated, it was 
 
39 '"Entire territory" of Ireland Would Be Part of EU if Unity Referendum Passed' 
(RTE, 28 April 2017) <https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0428/871185-brexit-northern-
ireland-eu/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
40 UK Government, 'Position Paper on Northern Ireland' (2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northern-ireland-and-ireland-a-
position-paper> accessed 15 October 2019.  
41 For a good summary see 'Brexit: Customs and Regulatory Arrangements' House 
of Commons Research Paper (2018) <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ 
ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8309#fullreport> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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assumed that the EU would introduce an equivalent system for third-country 
goods moving from the EU into the UK.   
The EU rejected this proposal on the grounds that it was simply impractical 
and met none of the EU's own requirements. The EU's collective starting 
position was that a non-member could not have more advantageous access to 
the single market than EU Member States. The UK proposal was not 
considered viable as it would have been both expensive and administratively 
complicated, but most importantly because it did not include a mechanism 
to ensure UK goods met single market regulatory standards.42   
A second UK proposal, called 'maximum facilitation' or 'max-fac', sought to 
utilise new technologies to automate procedures and remove the need for 
physical customs checks wherever possible.43 This was also rejected by the 
EU as being impractical, as the proposed technological solutions had not 
been deployed or proved workable on any other international border. 
Furthermore, they did not meet the requirements of keeping the Irish land 
border open or dealing with the issue of checks to ensure compliance with 
single market regulations.  
The EU made it clear that they would be willing to support a long-term 
arrangement whereby Northern Ireland was in de-facto terms treated as 
being within the single market. This followed a similar logic to the Republic 
of Cyprus accession agreement,44 which recognised the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus as the sovereign power for the island as a whole, but 
pragmatically allows goods produced in Northern Cyprus to enter EU 
markets as 'EU goods' once they are certified as being produced in Northern 
Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce.45 EU special status 
for Northern Ireland was acceptable to the EU as a response to needs of the 
 
42 Patrick Smith and Pat Leahy, 'EU leaders reject Theresa May's Brexit proposals' 
The Irish Times (21 September 2018).  
43 'Brexit: The Government's Customs Options' (BBC, 2 May 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43979180> accessed 15 October 2019. 
44 Art. 2, Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession.  
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Islands" in the EU Political and Legal Order' (2016) EUI Working Papers AEL 
2016/02 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/42484/AEL_2016_02.pdf? 
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peace process, the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, and the 
UK's international commitments under the Good Friday Agreement. The 
very small size of Northern Ireland's private sector also means that it is not 
an economic threat to the EU. This would also have been in line with the a 
wide range of other flexible territorial arrangements, from Greenland to the 
French Overseas Territories, that have previously been agreed by the EU.46 
The geographical context would also make any agreement between the UK 
and the EU likely to be judged as compatible with the 'frontier traffic 
exception' of Art. XXIV. 3 of GATT.47 In practice this approach would have 
kept the Irish land border completely open but would require Northern 
Ireland to maintain regulatory equivalence with the single market. It would 
also require the introduction of checks on goods crossing the Irish Sea in 
order to ensure compliance with the customs union and the single market. 
The UK government objected to any approach that would, in its view, 
introduce an element of separation between Northern Ireland and the rest of 
the UK and make the international status of Northern Ireland ambiguous.48  
In the face of UK opposition, and in the absence of any other concrete 
proposals, the EU proposed, in the Joint Report of 2017, to postpone a 
decision on the precise model to be adopted, while legally committing both 
sides to keeping the border open.49 This commitment to keep the Irish land 
border open, regardless of what future relationship the UK had with the 
single market, was agreed between the EU and the UK and became known as 
the 'Irish backstop'. Initially the EU proposed in the draft Withdrawal 
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of Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017). 
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Agreement of March 2018 that the backstop would only apply to Northern 
Ireland but, in order to reach a draft agreement, they reluctantly agreed to 
extend this provision to the whole of the UK at the suggestion of the British 
government, who wanted to avoid the accusation that they were agreeing to 
the differential treatment of Northern Ireland.50   
V. THE DRAFT WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT   
The draft withdrawal agreement, finalised in November 2018, included a 
lengthy Protocol on Northern Ireland, the 'backstop' to avoid a hard border 
on the island of Ireland.51 The agreement also allowed for the continuation of 
the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK and of the Single 
Electricity Market on the island of Ireland. It set out a framework involving 
a transition period, to the end of 2020, during which time all EU single 
market and customs rules would continue to apply to the UK as a whole and 
not only to Northern Ireland. It also allowed for the extension of the 
transition period, once only for a time-limited period; a decision to extend 
would have to be made by July 2020. During the transition period, both sides 
would 'use their best endeavours' to negotiate a new trade relationship 
between the EU and the UK, part of which would be measures to avoid a hard 
border on the island of Ireland. If no long-term trade deal had been agreed by 
the end of 2020, or by the end of an agreed extension period, then a backstop 
would be triggered. The backstop would consist of 'a single customs territory 
between the (European) Union and the United Kingdom'. Within this single 
customs territory, Northern Ireland would remain aligned with the rules and 
regulations of the EU single market in order to avoid regulatory checks on 
 
50 European Commission, 'Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United 
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the Irish border, even if the regulatory framework in place in the rest of the 
UK deviated from that of the EU. In these circumstances, some checks on 
Irish Sea crossings could be required, in addition to those already in place 
regarding animal and plant health and safety. Under this agreement, the UK 
would be required to meet 'level playing field conditions', to ensure it could 
not gain a competitive advantage by increasing state aid to industry or by 
dropping environmental standards or social protections. Those level playing 
conditions would continue as new regulations are passed. Either side would 
be able to request a review of the backstop, but it would require a joint 
decision of both the UK and the EU to end it.  
The Protocol was the most difficult section of the draft agreement to 
negotiate and once agreed it resulted in a number of resignations from the 
British government.52 It continued to be a source of contention for the DUP 
and elements of the pro-Brexit lobby of the Conservative Party, who argued, 
correctly, that the 'backstop' tied the UK for an indefinite period into a 
customs union with the EU, preventing it from having an independent trade 
policy. From the perspective of the EU, extending this special position to the 
whole of the UK was a major concession to UK sensitivity, something which 
has not been recognised in the British political discourse.53  
The support given to the Irish Government's position by the other EU 
Member States and the mechanism to avoid a hard border drew intense 
criticism from pro-Brexit MPs, who made the special 'backstop' arrangement 
for Northern Ireland, and its implications for the rest of the UK, the focus of 
their attacks on the Prime Minister's negotiating position and on the draft 
agreement. It also led to a series of highly charged anti-Irish attacks by 
leading Conservative MPs, including a statement that '[t]he Irish really 
should know their place' and even a threat to impose food export restrictions 
from the UK to force Ireland to reconsider.54 Ireland's ambassador to the 
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UK, Adrian O'Neill, wrote a public letter to the Spectator magazine stating 
that the 'prevailing tone and tenor' of articles about Ireland and Brexit had 
been 'with the occasional exception' anti-Irish.55 
The Withdrawal Agreement was widely welcomed in Northern Ireland as a 
pragmatic solution that could preserve the peace process in the context of 
Brexit, even though the preferred position of the majority was that the UK 
remain in the EU. This majority included Irish nationalists, the centrist pro-
UK Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, most business organisations, and the 
main civil society networks in Northern Ireland. However pro-Brexit 
unionists in the DUP rejected the Withdrawal Agreement based on their 
opposition to the Irish backstop. Although the DUP had stated that it did 
not want to see a closed border, they also do not support all-Ireland 
integration and cross border cooperation. The DUP believe that the 
Withdrawal Agreement would create a context where business, public policy 
and trade ties to the EU would be strengthened, as in these circumstances 
Northern Ireland would have a comparative advantage over the rest of the 
UK. The DUP leadership feared that in these circumstances political 
interests, and even perhaps political identity in Northern Ireland, would be 
increasingly shaped by that European focus, strengthening the case for Irish 
unity in the future. 
An opinion poll in December 2018 asked respondents in Northern Ireland if 
they agreed that the 'main business organisations in Northern Ireland 
(including the Ulster Farmers Union) are correct to back the UK 
government's current EU Withdrawal Agreement'. 54 per cent agreed with 
this statement, 37 per cent disagreed, and 9 per cent were unsure. When 
broken down by community, 86 per cent of self-defined Irish nationalists, 25 
per cent of self-defined unionists, and 46 per cent of those who said they were 
neutral on the constitutional question agreed with the statement.56  
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As the debate developed, with a possible 'Northern Ireland-only backstop' 
proposed (with consequent checks on the Irish Sea crossing), public opinion 
on the 'backstop' solution largely reflected the referendum result. 58.4 per 
cent of respondents said they would support a Northern Ireland-only 
backstop, with NI more closely aligned with the EU than the rest of the UK.57 
Broken down by party support, an NI-backstop and checks in the Irish Sea 
were supported by 98 per cent of supporters of the two major Irish nationalist 
parties, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, 89 per cent of Alliance Party voters, 86 per 
cent of Green Party voters, 27 per cent of Ulster Unionist voters, and 5 per 
cent of DUP voters. By self-defined community membership, this 
represented approximately 93 per cent of self-defined Irish nationalists, 20 
per cent of self-defined unionists, and 71 per cent of those who do not self-
define as nationalist or unionist. This pattern of Irish nationalists and 'others' 
strongly supporting a Northern Ireland backstop largely reflects the 
breakdown of the 2016 referendum vote.   
When the UK parliament failed in early 2019 to approve the Withdrawal 
Agreement, or any other approach to managing their withdrawal, the EU and 
the Irish government re-affirmed that an open Irish border was not 
negotiable, with Michel Barnier saying that the  
backstop is currently the only solution we have found to maintain the status 
quo on the island of Ireland ... Let me be very clear. We would not discuss 
anything with the UK until there is an agreement for Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.58 
The EU also insisted that even in the event of 'no deal', the question of 
Northern Ireland would be reflected in EU terms for any future trade 
agreement. These views are also reflected in the US, where the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi said in a speech to the Irish 
parliament that 'if the Brexit deal undermines the Good Friday accords there 
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will be no chance of a US-UK trade agreement'.59 At the same time, the EU 
repeatedly sought to 'de-dramatise' the backstop in their public statements 
and documents by emphasising their determination to find a commonly 
agreed long-term solution. This was explicitly done, for example, in the Joint 
Interpretative Instrument of 11 March 2019.60 In spite of this clarification, 
the Withdrawal Agreement was defeated in the UK Parliament on 15 January 
2019 and subsequently on 12 and 29 March 2019. Parliament was also unable 
to find any agreement on alternative ways forward. One proposal on which 
there was majority agreement, which became known as the 'Brady 
amendment', rejected the backstop in the Withdrawal Agreement and called 
on the Government to negotiate 'alternative arrangements', without 
specifying what whose arrangements would be. European newspapers 
reported the House of Commons' decisions using terms like 'madness', 
'crisis' and 'uncertainty'.61 In the wake of the failure of these motions, the 
British government continued negotiations with the EU, focusing on finding 
an agreement that would allow the backstop provision to be removed and 
therefore enable the agreement to achieve majority support in the British 
Parliament. The EU, however, remained united on its agreed position as 
reflected in the Withdrawal Agreement, including on the Northern Ireland 
provisions.  
Opposition to the backstop focused on the grounds that it limited British 
sovereignty and freedom to negotiate trade deals. However, the UK 
government did not accept a more limited 'Northern Ireland-only backstop' 
as proposed by the EU, on the grounds that it might appear to diminish UK 
sovereignty over Northern Ireland and that it was opposed by the DUP, who 
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were giving parliamentary support to the minority Conservative government. 
In a reputable opinion poll of Conservative Party members, almost 60 per 
cent of respondents said they would choose to proceed with Brexit even if it 
led to Northern Ireland and Scotland leaving the UK, suggesting a more 
England-focused sense of sovereignty and a prioritisation of state agency, 
rather than traditional territorial state sovereignty.62 The lack of clarity on 
what the UK parliament would support in practice made it very difficult for 
the EU to respond with concrete proposals. 
During debates on the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK Parliament and in 
the Conservative Party leadership contest from early June 2019, the 
articulation of what was meant by 'alternative arrangements' was frequently 
vague and when specifics were itemised they had already been demonstrated 
to be unacceptable to the EU. A repeated demand throughout these debates 
was to make the backstop time-limited. But as the only purpose of the 
backstop was to provide clarity in the event of no other agreement, a time-
limited backstop does not fulfil this function and is therefore unacceptable 
to the EU. The discussion in the Conservative party, both around the 
response to the failure to pass the Withdrawal Agreement and in the 
leadership contest, has demonstrated an apparent lack of awareness of the 
negotiating position of the EU and the diplomatic position of the Irish 
Government within the EU. A vague technological solution was again 
repeatedly raised in the Conservative Party leadership contest, with one 
Conservative Party candidate offering to pay for the infrastructure on the 
border, as though the cost of construction rather that the political and 
economic impact of the infrastructure was the key factor in the debate.63 This 
failure to positively engage with the EU is further demonstrated by the 
interim report, published in June 2019, of a conservative-linked think tank, 
the Alternative Arrangements Commission. This report again focused on 
technological solutions and also proposed a single regulatory area covering 
the UK and Ireland for agri-food as a means to deal with the border issue. 
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This would in effect mean Ireland leaving the single market, a prospect 
unacceptable to both Ireland and the EU as a whole.64 
The EU agreed to extend the deadline for the UK to leave the EU with a 
negotiated agreement to 31 October 2019 and, following this decision, the 
focus of the debate in UK has been on both the failure of the Government 
and Parliament to find a majority for any possible way forward and on the 
internal divisions in both the Conservative government and party. But at the 
core of this impasse is the apparent impossibility of achieving parliamentary 
support for the negotiated Withdrawal Agreement while it contains the 
Northern Ireland backstop and the failure of the political parties to come up 
with an alternative proposal that would be acceptable to the EU.  
The UK Parliament re-convened in September 2019 with a very clear 
position from Prime Minister Boris Johnson that the UK would leave the EU 
on 31 October 2019, with or without a Withdrawal Agreement. This meant 
that the question of final negotiations was at the heart of the debate for the 
UK. The Prime Minister reiterated that he wanted a deal and that he would 
not build infrastructure on the Irish Border. However according to EU 
sources, no new proposal of any kind was tabled which could replace the Irish 
backstop and meet the EU requirements of protecting the EU single market 
while also keeping the Irish border fully open.65 Prime Minister Johnson 
suggested he might accept an all-island agri-food area if the DUP did, but this 
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was not developed into a concrete proposal.66 The Telegraph newspaper 
reported on 2 September that two separate sources had confirmed that senior 
UK government advisor Dominic Cummings had said the discussions with 
the EU were a sham. The paper also reported that the UK Attorney General, 
Geoffrey Cox had warned Prime Minister Johnson on 1 August that his 
insistence on dropping the Northern Irish backstop was a 'complete fantasy'. 
By September 2019, a clear majority in the House of Commons was seeking 
to block a no-deal exit, while the majority of the Conservative Party were 
publicly saying that the UK should leave without a deal if its demands were 
not met.67 
VI. BREXIT, THE BORDER AND THE POLITICAL IMPACTS 
Brexit, and particularly the debate on the Irish border, has had an on-going 
political impact on the island of Ireland, on the British state and on the 
international response to the political relationship between Ireland and the 
UK. In her keynote speech of January 2017, Theresa May had expressed her 
intention of working with the devolved administrations of the UK as part of 
the Brexit negotiations, but in Northern Ireland this engagement was not 
possible as Northern Ireland has not had a functioning power-sharing 
Executive or Assembly since January 2017. It is, however, unlikely that a 
functioning Assembly or Executive in Northern Ireland could have had a 
significant impact on the wider political challenges of Brexit. The Assembly 
collapsed when Sinn Féin withdrew from government as a result of a political 
dispute over alleged corruption by their partners in government, the DUP, 
and also in response to the DUP's continued use of a veto to block legislation 
on same sex marriage and on Irish language rights. Restoring the Executive 
was made more difficult following the UK general election in 2017, when the 
DUP agreed to support the Conservative government in parliament. From 
this point there was no incentive for the DUP to re-enter government in 
Northern Ireland as they now had direct access to the British Prime 
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Minister, who needed their votes to stay in office. Furthermore, even if the 
Assembly could not procedurally force an Executive response, the DUP 
would have been politically embarrassed by a pro-Remain majority using the 
Assembly to highlight the limited public support for the DUP's hard-line 
pro-Brexit position. The DUP had opposed the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998 and had later only agreed to enter the power-sharing Executive as an 
alternative to some form of informal power-sharing between the British and 
Irish Governments.68 While the Executive had functioned well under the 
leadership of former DUP leader Ian Paisley, the party was not ideologically 
committed to a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland. As Sinn 
Féin and the DUP hold diametrically opposed positions on EU membership, 
on the border and on the Withdrawal Agreement, even if the Northern 
Ireland Executive had been functioning they could not have agreed a 
common 'Northern Ireland' position on Brexit and therefore they could not 
have made an input into the negotiations or provided a coherent voice 
representing the interests of Northern Ireland, because such a voice does not 
exist. 
The major political impact in Northern Ireland of the Brexit debate is the 
shift of political opinion as a result of the threat of a 'hard' border. The Irish 
nationalist population in Northern Ireland prior to Brexit was divided on the 
timing of a vote on a united Ireland, given that, following the 1998 agreement, 
most Irish nationalists were willing to take a long-term perspective on 
constitutional change, with only a minority supporting the holding of a 
border poll in the short-term. Following the Brexit referendum, the Irish 
nationalist community in Northern Ireland has become both more unified 
and more militant in their views on the question of unity. Opinion polls show 
Irish nationalists much more willing to positively support a referendum on 
Irish unity, marking a distinct break with previous polling trends, with the 
qualification that polling data on support for a united Ireland is very sensitive 
to the precise wording of the questions, to the methodology, and to the 
political context at the time of polling.  
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In the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, opinion polls suggested that 
many Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland were content with the evolving 
status quo. They were not seeking a border poll in the short term and would 
not vote for unity if such a referendum was held.69 In response to a 2002 
opinion poll, which asked respondents how they would vote if a referendum 
was held 'tomorrow', only 58 per cent of Catholics said they would vote yes, 
20 per cent would vote no and the rest were either undecided or did not reply. 
In the same poll, only 3 per cent of Protestants and 18 per cent of those who 
did not identify with either of the main religious communities said they 
would vote for unity 'tomorrow'. By comparison, following the Brexit 
referendum a December 2018 poll found that 35 per cent of nationalists 
wanted a border poll to be held in 2019, 79 per cent wanted one within 5 years, 
and 89 per cent wanted a poll within 10 years.70 In the same survey, 93 per cent 
of nationalists said they would vote to leave the UK, and a further 5 per cent 
of nationalist 'probably would', if the poll was held in 2019 in the context of 
'no deal'.71 In another opinion poll in January 2019, 94 per cent of nationalists, 
32 per cent of unionists, and 71 per cent of 'others' thought Brexit would make 
a united Ireland 'more likely in the next 10 years'.72 This shift in nationalist 
opinion – in seeking a border poll in a relatively short time span; in their own 
declared voting intentions; and in their predictions about constitutional 
change – are all radical departures from pre-Brexit referendum polling, which 
showed a more divided nationalist community.  
There is also evidence that a majority of the centrist 15 per cent of the 
population, who do not vote for mainstream Unionist or Irish nationalist 
parties, would, in the context of a 'hard' or 'no-deal' Brexit, shift their support 
from the status quo within the UK and would consider voting for Irish unity 
 
69 See for example 'NI Life and Times 2002 poll' <https://www.ark. 
ac.uk/nilt/2002/Political_Attitudes/REFUNIFY.html>  
70 <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/024943_b89b42d32364461298ba5fe7867d82e1. 
pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
71 <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/024943_b89b42d32364461298ba5fe7867d82e1. 
pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
72 <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/024943_b195541bffa647a7882be133023ff803.pdf> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
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in order to stay in the EU.73 This shift is driven by the potentially very 
negative economic outcomes of Brexit for Northern Ireland in particular, but 
it has also been facilitated by the liberalisation of the Irish state, which on the 
basis of referenda passed legislation to legalise same-sex marriage in 2015, to 
liberalise access to legal abortions in 2018, and liberalise divorce laws in 
2019.74 In 2018, 37 per cent of 'others' in Northern Ireland wanted a border 
poll within 5 years, with 68 per cent wanting this within 10 years. If there was 
no deal, 70 per cent of such voters said they were certain or likely to vote for 
Irish unity, whereas if Brexit did not proceed their responses moved to 
'uncertain' or 'probably remain in the UK'.75 
The overall picture from post-referendum opinion polls is that Northern 
Irish nationalists have become more supportive of Irish unity in the context 
of Brexit, even in the short term, while the traditionally pro-UK union bloc 
has become more fragmented at the margins. This fragmentation is reflected 
in the publicly stated views of individuals from a unionist background, 
involved in business, trade or cross-border engagement, who campaigned in 
Northern Ireland for the UK to remain in the EU.76 It also reflects the views 
of the major economic interest groups including the Ulster Farmers Union 
and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in Northern Ireland, who 
supported the draft Withdrawal Agreement of November 2018, and 
specifically the 'Irish backstop', if the alternative was a hard Brexit rather 
than a vote to remain in the EU.77 The volatility in the 2018 and 2019 polls is 
 
73 Lucid Talk, 'Tracker Polling in Northern Ireland' (2018) 
<https://www.lucidtalk.co.uk/single-post/2018/12/07/LT-NI-Tracker-Poll---
Winter-2018> accessed 15 October 2019.;  Irish Times (7 March 2019). 
74 For a good summary of recent economic reports, see Tony Connelly 'Double 
Whammy: A No-deal Brexit and Northern Ireland' (RTE, 15 June 2019) 
<https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2019/0614/1055418-double-
whammy-a-no-deal-brexit-and-northern-ireland/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
75 <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/024943_b89b42d32364461298ba5fe7867d82e1. 
pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
76 Gerard McCann and Paul Hainsworth, 'Brexit and Northern Ireland: The 2016 
Referendum on the United Kingdom's Membership of the European Union' (2017) 
32(2) Irish Political Studies 333. 
77 'Brexit Deal: PM Thanks NI Business Leaders for Support' (BBC, 22 November 
2018) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46296605> accessed 15 
October 2019. 
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significant compared to the relative stability of previous polling, but for the 
first time since modern polling has been conducted in Northern Ireland, 
credible opinion polls are showing that in the event of a 'hard Brexit', a 
majority of the population could vote to join a united Ireland in order to re-
join the EU.78   
The Irish Government does not want the debate on the Brexit negotiations 
to become complicated by a call for a border poll and its policy is to defend 
the Good Friday Agreement as providing the framework for the peaceful 
development of the island of Ireland by preventing a hard border.79 It 
anticipates that in a post-Brexit world, if there is a negotiated agreement that 
does not impose a hard border, then the demand for Irish unity will again 
become more muted. Others, including former President of Ireland Mary 
McAeese, have argued that the Brexit referendum was an example of how not 
to conduct serious constitutional reform and that before any referendum on 
Irish unity there should be a full and lengthy public debate.80 In the 
circumstances where there is an increased demand for a united Ireland, under 
the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, the British Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland is obliged to call a referendum, if it appears to them that 'a 
majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should 
cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland'.81 
The Agreement also commits the British government in the event of a vote 
for Irish unity to legislate for a united Ireland.82 The British Secretary of State 
has some discretion and can use their judgement on the question of whether 
or not the level of public support for a united Ireland justifies the calling of a 
referendum, but when a majority clearly exists they are bound by the 
Agreement to hold a referendum.   
 
78 Lucid Talk poll data <https://www.lucidtalk.co.uk/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
79 Foreign Minister Simon Coveney, quoted in Elaine Edwards 'Coveney Says Calls 
for Border Poll "Not Wise and Not Welcome"' Irish Times (30 May 2018) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/coveney-says-calls-for-border-poll-
not-wise-and-not-welcome-1.3514226> accessed 15 October 2019. 
80 Speech by former President of Ireland Mary McAleese to the DCU Brexit 
Institute on 29 March 2019. See <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/official-speeches/> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
81 Good Friday Agreement (1998) Annex A. 
82 Good Friday Agreement (1998) Annex A. 
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During the Brexit negotiations the UK government experienced the 
practical diplomatic impact which the Good Friday Agreement has had on 
Northern Ireland's status. The international recognition of the agreement 
has changed how UK sovereignty over Northern Ireland is perceived 
internationally, shifting it from one of unqualified UK sovereignty over 
Northern Ireland to the international recognition of an agreement between 
the UK and Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement reformulated the legal 
basis of British sovereignty over Northern Ireland, with the recognition that 
British rule rested on the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. The 
Good Friday Agreement gave a legal basis to the recognition of the rights of 
Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland and the rights of the Irish government 
as a signatory to the treaty. During the negotiation process, this shift was seen 
in the support given by the EU to Ireland's demand that there should be no 
hard border on the island.  
The experience of the referendum, the Brexit negotiations, and the failure to 
pass the Withdrawal Agreement through the UK parliament, have fractured 
and undermined the British state and the strength of the union between its 
component parts. The decision by the British government to refuse to 
consider the option of an 'Irish Sea' border and the entrenched conservative 
nationalism of the DUP and sections of the Conservative Party made an 
agreement with the EU difficult to achieve. It has therefore been impossible 
to find a parliamentary majority willing to support the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement. While the imposition of a land border on the island of Ireland 
will be problematic for security, social and economic reasons, it also could 
bring a 'united' Ireland closer as a means of dealing with these problems. 
While this new situation will also have potential difficulties, it is unlikely to 
undermine the Irish state or hinder its economic development. However, it 
seems unlikely that the UK will easily recover from the deep divisions and 
political upheavals engendered by the Brexit process, whatever the final 
outcome is. The failure to reach agreement has heightened internal political 
tensions in Northern Ireland and the EU remains determined that it will not 
accept a Withdrawal Agreement which disrupts cross-border travel and 
cooperation prior to the withdrawal date of 31 October 2019. 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
The draft Withdrawal Agreement finalised in November 2018 would 
minimise the risks for Ireland compared to a unilateral withdrawal by the UK 
from the EU, as it would keep the border open; a hard border is the most 
immediate and serious threat. Even if the current Withdrawal Agreement 
was accepted by the UK parliament there would still be negative underlying 
trends: the UK 'post-Brexit' would become a more insular society, 
increasingly detached from the rest of Europe, and in those circumstances 
Northern Ireland would be likely to face a period of economic and political 
decline and new political tensions. With the UK outside the EU, the 
management of the peace process will be significantly weakened, as the UK 
would no longer be part of the framework of EU regional cooperation and 
policy development that underpins the cross border integration aspects of 
the peace process. It will also reduce the potential for ongoing informal 
meetings between Irish and UK ministers at the margins of EU meetings. 
This lack of regular interaction post-Brexit is unlikely to be addressed by the 
same level of bi-lateral contacts and will potentially weaken inter-
governmental cooperation. This will in turn inhibit the development of 
measures to promote the economic development of the border regions and 
the management of the peace process in the difficult context of adjustment 
post-Brexit.  
A disruption to cross-border cooperation would reflect the de facto policy 
aims of the DUP by stopping or slowing the process of neo-functional 
cooperation by erecting barriers, physical and cultural, between the two parts 
of the island of Ireland and seeking to cement Northern Ireland's 
dependency on Britain. In these circumstances, Irish nationalists, rather 
than working within the framework of the Good Friday Agreement for a 
gradual process of change, may instead mobilise for a referendum on Irish 
unity. The political outcome of these pressures and their capacity to 
undermine the peace process depends on the disposition of the political 
middle ground in Northern Ireland, in terms of how much they prioritise re-
joining the EU and whether they would be willing to support Irish unity to 
achieve EU membership. The Brexit debate and the divisions on the location 
of the 'border' have already increased internal political tensions in Northern 
Ireland, as evidenced by the failure to restore the devolved power-sharing 
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government during the pre-withdrawal period. These dynamics can also be 
seen in the escalation of inter-communal tensions compared to the peace 
process era and in a return to divisive political relationships, with the 
potential this has for a resumption of armed conflict.   
While the bleak post-Brexit scenario explains the determination of the Irish 
government to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland, the reasons why 
the British government so trenchantly opposed the 'Irish Sea border' 
solution and a Northern Ireland-only backstop are more complex. The 
insistence of the DUP that it would not continue to provide support for the 
minority Conservative party government if they agreed to any solution that 
involved a special status for Northern Ireland, even one that was to their 
economic advantage, is only part of the explanation. A significant number of 
Conservative MPs, including leading figures in the party, also opposed any 
change in the status of Northern Ireland which would weaken its position as 
an integral part of the UK or diminish British sovereignty over the region. 
While a Northern Ireland-only backstop would allow the UK to pursue an 
independent trade policy for Great Britain, for this element of the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party such trade opportunities are seemingly not 
as important as keeping Northern Ireland fully within the UK. This is the 
case even though the majority of the wider rank and file membership of the 
Conservative Party prioritise achieving Brexit over keeping Northern 
Ireland within the UK.83 The UK cabinet rejected a Northern Ireland-only 
backstop, either believing a UK-wide backstop would receive parliamentary 
support or assuming that the EU would drop the backstop completely once 
the threat of no-deal became imminent. However, although the Withdrawal 
Agreement had the support of Prime Minister Theresa May and other 
leading members of the party, it did not have the support of the majority of 
the party. Underlying the refusal of Conservative MPs to support the 
negotiated agreement seemed to be the belief that the EU would not hold 
firm on this issue. As the debate progressed during 2019, the overwhelmingly 
majority of the Parliamentary Conservative Party were willing to leave the 
 
83 See 'Most Conservative members would see party destroyed to achieve Brexit' 
(YouGov, 18 June 2019) <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2019/06/18/most-conservative-members-would-see-party-destroye> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
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EU without a deal rather than accept the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated 
during May's term as Prime Minister.  
Ultimately, many UK policy-makers expected that the EU, as a result of 
internal divisions, would drop its support for Ireland and abandon the 
backstop provision from the Withdrawal Agreement (or agree a 'time-
limited' backstop). This strategic miscalculation reflects a core part of what 
a section of the UK's political elites believe it means to be British and their 
perception of the place the UK occupies in the world. The UK government 
never believed that the EU's own interests required a backstop and during 
the leadership contest following Theresa May's resignation most candidates 
framed the issue as a bi-lateral one between the UK and Ireland. That this 
view was not shared by the EU Member States, and the EU collectively, was 
not internalised by the UK government or the Conservative Party. It was the 
central issue that made the negotiations so frustrating and inexplicable for 
the EU negotiators and the governments of the other Member States. The 
EU's initial position was for a Northern Ireland-only backstop, allowing the 
rest of the UK to move outside of the customs union and single market. The 
EU27 reluctantly agreed to a UK-wide backstop at the insistence of UK 
negotiators. It has been difficult for the EU to understand why the UK was 
unable to deal with the question of the Irish border and the requirements of 
the single market in a manner which did not escalate the language to one of 
state sovereignty. The EU's own experience of sharing and occasionally 
fudging sovereignty in order to reach agreements may have led them to 
underestimate the strength of this traditional view within the Conservative 
Party. However, even when it became absolutely clear in August/September 
2019 that the EU would not shift their position on the Irish border, the 
Conservative Party did not table any substantial proposal to resolve the issue. 
As a result, apart from the negative political impacts in Northern Ireland, the 
Brexit negotiations have also led to an increased negativity towards the UK 
position across the EU27 and a shift from a widespread hope that Brexit could 
be reversed towards a growing view that continued UK membership of the 
EU, with repeatedly postponed decisions on its final status, is bad for Europe.  
If the UK leaves the EU without a withdrawal agreement, it remains unclear 
what will happen on the Irish border. Both the Irish government and the EU 
refrained from speculation on this issue during the period of negotiation and 
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while the draft Withdrawal Agreement remains on the table. The Irish 
government's priority has been to secure a withdrawal agreement that 
ensures that there will not be a hard border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland and it has not engaged in a discussion of other scenarios. In response 
to the increased likelihood that the UK will leave the EU without a deal, 
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar stated that a Withdrawal Agreement without a 
backstop is just as bad for Ireland as a no-deal exit by the UK and that Ireland, 
therefore, has no interest in agreeing to have the backstop weakened or 
removed to allow the UK parliament to pass the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement.84 If Ireland did agree to the removal of the backstop provision, 
this would end that phase of negotiations. It would cement the idea of a hard 
international border on the island and future negotiations would be focused 
on how to technically deal with this and not how to re-open the border. 
Undesirable as a no-deal exit would be for Ireland, it would still leave the Irish 
border as an open question in future negotiations between the UK and the 
EU. Since Johnson became Prime Minister, the UK government, in framing 
the issue as a bi-lateral one and in suggesting a joint Irish-UK agri-food 
market, requiring Ireland to leave the EU single market,85 has not understood 
the Irish position and it has also not appreciated that Ireland's interests, even 
in the worst case scenario of a no-deal Brexit, are linked to remaining a full 
part of the EU and its single market. On the questions of a backstop-type 
provision and of support for the peace process in any Withdrawal 
Agreement, or indeed any future trade deal, the UK Government has from 
2016 onwards consistently underestimated the degree of EU solidarity with 
Ireland and the degree to which the EU's own interests were reflected in its 
negotiation stance. It is this failure of political judgement that has led to the 
rejection of the negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and continues to block 
agreement on a way forward.
 
84 'No Backstop as Bad for Ireland as No Deal – Varadkar' (RTE, 15 June 2019) 
<https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2019/0615/1055513-ireland-brexit/> accessed 15 
October 2019. 
85 Tony Connelly, 'Report Suggests New Agri-Food Area for Ireland, UK' (RTE, 24 
June 2019) <https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2019/0624/1057201-alternative-
arrangements/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
